Facts of the Case:

The appellant-wife had filed a petition under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”) seeking maintenance and compensation from the respondent-husband. The learned Magistrate, by an order dated February 23, 2015, granted the appellant Rs.12,000 per month as maintenance and Rs.1,00,000 as compensation. The respondent-husband did not provide any evidence during the proceedings, and the order of maintenance and compensation became final, as the respondent did not appeal further.

Later, the respondent-husband filed an application under Section 25 of the DV Act, seeking modification or revocation of the order passed in Criminal Miscellaneous Matter. The Magistrate dismissed this application. Dissatisfied with this, the respondent filed an appeal under Section 29 of the DV Act, which was allowed by the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court remanded the matter back to the Magistrate for reconsideration, with both parties being given the opportunity to present evidence.

The appellant-wife challenged this order before the Karnataka High Court, which upheld the Appellate Court’s decision and directed the Magistrate to proceed with the case, without being influenced by the observations made in the appeal. Being aggrieved by this, the appellant-wife filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

Contention of the Petitioner (Appellant-Wife):

The appellant argued that the respondent’s application under Section 25 of the DV Act was not maintainable. According to the appellant, the scope of Section 25(2) is limited to alteration, modification, or revocation of an order based on a change in circumstances after the order is passed. The respondent’s prayer for setting aside the original order dated February 23, 2015, which had already attained finality, was beyond the scope of Section 25.

The respondent also sought a refund of the entire maintenance amount already paid, claiming fraud by the appellant. The appellant contended that such a prayer was contrary to the provisions of Section 25(2), which only allows changes in the order from the date of the application, not retrospectively.

The appellant emphasized that the order dated February 23, 2015, had attained finality, as the respondent failed to challenge it in a timely manner. Hence, the High Court’s direction to reconsider the respondent’s application was erroneous.

Contention of the Respondent (Husband):

The respondent claimed that the appellant-wife had misrepresented herself as unemployed and in need of maintenance, whereas she was employed. The respondent argued that this misrepresentation constituted fraud, and therefore, he sought a revocation of the original maintenance order.

The respondent submitted that his application under Section 25 was based on the change in circumstances, specifically discovering the appellant’s employment. He argued that both the Appellate Court and the High Court were justified in remanding the matter to the Magistrate for reconsideration based on this change.

Court’s Observation

The Supreme Court observed that Section 25(2) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 allows for the alteration, modification, or revocation of any order if there is a change in circumstances. However, such changes must relate to a period after the original order was passed, and the scope of Section 25(2) does not extend to setting aside an order entirely or seeking retrospective refunds of maintenance already paid.

The Court held that Section 25(2) cannot be invoked to seek the setting aside of an original order, particularly one that has attained finality. Since the respondent’s appeal was dismissed for delay and no further challenge was made, the order of maintenance had merged with the appellate court’s decision. Therefore, the respondent’s prayers to revoke the 2015 order were not maintainable.

The Court emphasized that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is a piece of civil legislation that transcends religious and social backgrounds, providing protection to women from domestic violence, irrespective of their background.

“The Act is a piece of Civil Code which is applicable to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for a more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution and in order to protect women victims of domestic violence occurring in a domestic relationship.”

The Court clarified that the respondent’s application under Section 25(2) of the Act was not maintainable, as it sought a retrospective application of relief—i.e., setting aside the 2015 maintenance order and seeking a refund of the amounts paid. The Court stated that any modification or revocation under this section can only be prospective and must relate to changes in circumstances occurring after the original order was passed.

Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Appellate Court and dismissed the respondent’s application under Section 25 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

The appeal was allowed, and the application filed by the respondent was dismissed. The Court reinforced that the Act is designed to protect all women in India, irrespective of their religious or social background, and that modifications under Section 25 must be based on future circumstances.

– Deeksha Rai