Facts of the Case

The Appellant was employed as a driver by the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) on 01.05.2014, after fulfilling all eligibility conditions. During a routine medical examination conducted by the corporation’s medical officer, he was diagnosed with colour blindness and declared unfit to continue as a driver. The Appellant challenged the medical report and simultaneously sought alternate employment in the corporation. Both his appeal and request for reassessment were rejected by the Appellate Authority and a Medical Board, respectively.

Subsequently, the corporation issued an order on 27.01.2016, retiring the Appellant with effect from 06.01.2016 on medical grounds, and granted him additional monetary benefits as per internal policy. The Appellant approached the High Court, challenging the retirement order and seeking alternate employment based on Clause 14 of a Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) dated 17.12.1979, entered under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This clause specifically assured alternate employment to drivers who became colour blind during service.

The Single Judge of the High Court ruled in his favour. However, a Division Bench reversed the decision, citing that colour blindness does not fall under the definition of “disability” under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 and relied on APSRTC v. B.S. Reddy (2018). Aggrieved, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Contentions of the Petitioner

The Appellant argued that the retirement was unlawful as it violated the binding terms of the 1979 MoS. Clause 14 of this agreement explicitly provided that drivers diagnosed with colour blindness would be given alternate employment with continuity of service and pay protection. This settlement was concluded during conciliation proceedings under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore had statutory force under Section 18(3).

It was contended that the later MoS dated 22.12.1986 could not override the specific provisions of the 1979 settlement, as it merely provided a general clause (Clause 5(d)) for medically unfit drivers. The principle of generalia specialibus non derogant was invoked, asserting that a specific provision (1979) would prevail over a general one (1986). The Appellant further argued that his disability was acquired during service and thus entitled him to protection under Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995. The denial of alternate employment, despite the availability of roles such as “Shramik”, was arbitrary and discriminatory. Judgments such as Kunal Singh v. Union of India and Mohamed Ibrahim v. CMD, TANGEDCO were relied upon to underscore the employer’s constitutional obligation to provide reasonable accommodation.

Contentions of the Respondent

Senior Advocate appearing for the APSRTC, contended that the 1979 MoS was superseded by the 1986 MoS, which governed all cases of medical unfitness. According to Clause 5(d) of the 1986 MoS, alternate jobs may be identified “to the extent possible”; failing which, employees were to be retired with additional monetary benefits. The 1986 MoS did not contain any special provision for colour blindness.

It was further argued that the Appellant was illiterate and lacked qualifications required for reassignment. The Corporation maintained that there were no suitable posts available for redeployment, and, under the existing service regulations, there was no obligation to reappoint the Appellant. Moreover, colour blindness did not fall under the statutory definition of “disability” under Section 2(i) of the 1995 Act, and therefore Section 47 was inapplicable. The respondent relied on the precedent set in B.S. Reddy, which restricted the applicability of Section 47 only to those disabilities enumerated under the Act.

Court’s Observations

The Supreme Court rejected the respondent’s contention that the 1979 MoS had been overridden. The Court held that settlements concluded under Section 12(3) during conciliation are binding under Section 18(3) not only on the direct parties but also on all workmen and successors. Clause 14 of the 1979 settlement specifically addressed redeployment of colour-blind drivers, granting them alternate posts with full-service benefits. In contrast, Clause 5(d) of the 1986 MoS was general in nature, referring broadly to “medically unfit drivers” and lacked the specificity or revocatory language needed to annul the 1979 provision.

The Court applied the doctrine of generalia specialibus non derogant and affirmed that the 1979 MoS continued to govern cases involving colour-blindness. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Corporation had continued to follow Clause 14 in other similar cases post-1986, indicating its continued legal validity.

Addressing the inaction of the Corporation, the Court found no evidence of any effort to assess alternative posts, consider the Appellant’s representation for the post of Shramik, or conduct a suitability inquiry. Such failure violated natural justice and the mandatory requirement in the 1986 MoS (even if assumed to apply) to explore alternative jobs “to the extent possible.”  The Corporation could not rely on internal circulars to defeat a statutory settlement. Inaction was equated to “institutional exclusion.”

The Court rejected the applicability of B.S. Reddy to the facts of the case, as the Appellant’s rights emanated from a binding industrial settlement, not merely from disability law. The Division Bench of the High Court was faulted for failing to distinguish between statutory disability protections and binding employment terms under industrial law.

The Court also reaffirmed constitutional and international obligations to reasonably accommodate employees acquiring disability during service. Relying on Kunal Singh, Mohamed Ibrahim, and Vikash Kumar, the Court held that employers must not arbitrarily retire employees who remain functionally capable of performing alternative roles. Reasonable accommodation was seen as integral to the right to equality under Articles 14 and 21. It was emphasised that “the employer’s discretion ends where the employee’s dignity begins.”

Court’s Order

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court in W.A. No. 1343 of 2017. It directed the APSRTC to reinstate the Appellant within eight weeks to a suitable post consistent with his condition and on the same pay grade he held as of 06.01.2016. The Court awarded 25% of the arrears of salary, allowances, and benefits from the date of termination to the date of reinstatement. The intervening period was to be treated as continuous service for all purposes. No order as to costs was made.

Written by Adv. Deeksha Rai